CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PRACTICAL ETHICS
2019 ANNUAL CONFERENCE
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABOUT THE CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PRACTICAL ETHICS .......................................................... 2

  *History ................................................................................................................................................................ 2
  *Our Executive .................................................................................................................................................... 2
  *Our 2019 Conference Program Chairs ........................................................................................................ 2

CONFERENCE REGISTRATION & GENERAL INFORMATION ............................................................................. 3

Location: .......................................................................................................................................................... 3

Interdisciplinary Panel hosted by the CSSPE ........................................................................................................ 4

  *When: June 3  19:00 - 20:30 ..................................................................................................................... 4
  *Where: congress is still assigning the space ............................................................................................ 4
  *Sovereignty and Hypocrisy Impeding Reconciliation on Campuses in Canada ........................................ 4

PRESENTATION FORMAT AND ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES ......................................................................... 5

  *Format for Presentations .......................................................................................................................... 5
  *Accessibility Guidelines for Presenters from the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy .............. 5

SCHEDULE AT A GLANCE ................................................................................................................................. 7

ABSTRACTS ..................................................................................................................................................... 8

  *Day One – Saturday June 1, 2019 .................................................................................................................. 8
  *Day Two – Sunday June 2, 2019 ................................................................................................................... 12
  *Day Three – Monday June 3, 2019 ............................................................................................................. 16
ABOUT THE CANADIAN SOCIETY FOR THE STUDY OF PRACTICAL ETHICS

History
The Canadian Society for the Study of Practical Ethics (CSSPE) /Société canadienne pour l'étude de l'éthique appliquée (SCEEA) was formed in 1987. It mounts an annual conference at a different Canadian university each year in conjunction with the Congress of the Humanities and Social Sciences/Congrès des sciences humaines.

The CSSPE/SCEEA is committed to the study of all the major areas of practical ethics (bioethics, business ethics, environmental ethics, ethics of technology, health care ethics, professional ethics, etc.) as well as to addressing ethical issues and concerns which arise in the humanities, social sciences, sciences, professions, and other areas of activity and learning.

The CSSPE/SCEEA has mounted many interdisciplinary conferences with other societies, groups, and institutions. These include the Queen’s Cross-Faculty Ethics Forum, the Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association, the Canadian Federation for the Humanities, the Canadian Philosophical Association, the Ethics Practitioners Association of Canada, the International Society for the Study of Environmental Ethics, the Canadian Theological Association, the Westminster Institute for Ethics and Human Values, and others.

Because of its diverse background and interests, the CSSPE/SCEEA attracts members from a wide variety of fields and occupations, including academia, the business community, the professions, and the civil service. Membership is open to anyone interested in practical ethics.

Our Executive

President – Melany Banks, Wilfred Laurier University
Past President – Sandra Tomsons, University of Winnipeg
Vice President – Dianne Lalonde, University of Western Ontario
Secretary/Treasurer – Kira Tomsons, Douglas College
Member-at-Large – Philip McEwan, York University
Member-at-Large – Andrew Molas, York University
Member-at-Large – Bruce Morito, Athabasca University
Member-at-Large – Alex Wellington, Ryerson University

Our 2019 Conference Program Chairs

Laila Khoshkar, University of Toronto
Dan McArthur, York University
CONFERENCE REGISTRATION & GENERAL INFORMATION

To present you must:

a) be a member of CSSPE
b) be registered at Congress

To become a member of CSSPE, please fill out the membership form on the CSSPE website and send it to Kira Tomsons along with payment according to the membership fee schedule on the website. You can send Kira a cheque, use an email transfer if you want to pay now, or you can pay the membership fee at Congress to the person who will be designated to collect fees/issue receipts. For snail mail requests, please send to:

Kira Tomsons
Philosophy Department
Douglas College
PO Box 2503
New Westminster, BC
V3L 5B2

To register for Congress, go to the Congress website. Note that you must pay two sets of fees:

1. the fees for registering for Congress
2. the fees for the association (different from the membership fees). If you are a regular member, the fee is $35, if you are a student, the fee is $20.

Simply follow the instructions on the website to register and be sure to pick up the registration package when you arrive at the central registration location.

Child Care: if you require child care during Congress, you can register online on the Congress website.

Location:
We will be located for the entire conference in room 135 in the Earth and Ocean Sciences Main (EOSM). There is a conference map available at the congress website here:
Interdisciplinary Panel hosted by the CSSPE
When: June 3, 19:00 - 20:30
Where: congress is still assigning the space

Sovereignty and Hypocrisy Impeding Reconciliation on Campuses in Canada
This panel aims to shine the light of truth on reconciliation in universities. Reconciliation requires truth; but, historical truth is not enough. Reconciliation requires honesty in the present. To talk about reconciliation when you are still making decisions for Indigenous people is hypocritical. To reconcile with Indigenous peoples, universities must decolonize to stop constraining Indigenous people’s sovereignty. Guests on Indigenous lands have to respect and adhere to laws of the land.

Speakers:
• Lee Maracle, Indigenous Education Centre, University of Toronto
• Lorraine Mayer, Native Studies, Brandon University
• Chaw-win-is Ogilvie, Indigenous Education and Political Science, University of Victoria
PRESENTATION FORMAT AND ACCESSIBILITY GUIDELINES

Format for Presentations

a) For single papers, you will have 40 minutes in total to present. We usually encourage papers to be no more than 25 minutes as the discussion is usually quite lively and we like to stay on time.
b) For panel presentations, the time for all panelists and discussion in total is an hour and a half, and it is encouraged that there be about half an hour for discussion, leaving an hour for the panelists to present.

We have booked A/V equipment so that people can use a data projector but if you are using devices that are not compatible with standard PC equipment (like Mac products) then you will be responsible for any adapters you may require in order to use the projectors. We have a wide variety of preferences for presenting, so some people do not use the projector and some do. There is no ‘standard’ in that respect.

Accessibility Guidelines for Presenters from the Canadian Society for Women in Philosophy

Prepare to be flexible. Access needs are shifting and fluid, and it may be that even your accessible presentation will need to shift depending on who attends your presentation.

Create a script or detailed outline for your talk and bring copies to distribute. Many people find it hard to follow auditory talks, but this is particularly helpful for those who are deaf and also helps the many people who struggle to process you reading your paper, such as those with traumatic brain injuries and second-language learners. If your talk is not scripted, please provide a detailed outline. If you do not want your work cited without your permission, indicate this on your draft (or collect drafts at the end – the moderator can assist with this).

Make your PowerPoint more accessible. (NOTE: current best practice, as articulated in the 2017 Guidelines posted by PhiloSOPHIA: the Society for Continental Feminism, is to avoid PowerPoint altogether). Avoid flashing images, arguments that rely solely on color, and small print. Use a plain background without any watermark, photo, or design behind the text. Plan to have a backup (such as a handout, or using the board) if your PowerPoint fails or is not accessible to your audience.

Bring versions of all handouts and scripts in large print (17 point or larger).

Large-print copies should be single-sided as they may be held close to the face for viewing.

Consider sharing your paper, script, or slides online. This can be in addition to providing printed drafts.

Speak at a reasonable pace. People read much faster than they typically talk, which is hard for everyone to follow.
Announce the accessibility practices you are using. Before you begin, note that scripts, large print, copies of the PowerPoint, etc., are available. Ask if you can be heard. Have someone distribute handouts rather than having people come forward.

Describe any images you display. This includes participants with low vision and makes your images more purposeful for everyone. Rich auditory descriptions are best prepared in advance, and avoid a bare description merely of what is in the photo – communicate meaning if that is clear and pertinent to those who can see the images.

Use captioned videos. Avoid forcing participants to choose between watching videos or interpreters. Recognize that YouTube automatic captioning is flawed. Resources on captioning YouTube videos is here: [http://ncdae.org/resources/cheatsheets/youtube.php](http://ncdae.org/resources/cheatsheets/youtube.php)

Re-voice questions. Re-voice (repeat) the questions so all can hear before answering them.

Avoid wearing scents.
# Schedule at a Glance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DAY 1 – SATURDAY, JUNE 1</th>
<th>DAY 2 – SUNDAY, JUNE 2</th>
<th>DAY 3 – MONDAY, JUNE 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>9:00</strong></td>
<td><strong>9:00</strong></td>
<td><strong>9:00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental Health Stigma, Narrative, and the Lived Experience of Schizophrenia</td>
<td>Obedience and the Fallibility Thesis</td>
<td>Non State Actors and Global Collective Action Problems</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andrew Molas</td>
<td>Andrés Molina Ochoa</td>
<td>Dan McArthur</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>9:40</strong></td>
<td><strong>9:40</strong></td>
<td><strong>9:40</strong></td>
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<td>Current Psychiatric Practice: Psychopharmacology v. Psychotherapy</td>
<td>Undoing the Notion of a Right to Do Wrong</td>
<td>Spherical Students in a Vacuum: Teaching business ethics in a less than ideal world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corinna Lee</td>
<td>Geoff Callaghan</td>
<td>Greg Andres</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>10:20</strong></td>
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<td>Catered Break (10 minutes)</td>
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<td><strong>10:30</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Laila Khoshkar</td>
<td>William Buschert</td>
<td>Josh Mund</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>11:10</strong></td>
<td><strong>11:10</strong></td>
<td><strong>11:10</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>A Place for Patient Testimony in Evidence-Based Medicine</td>
<td>Technological Unemployment, Citizenship, and Dignity</td>
<td>A Relational Approach to Duties Regarding Non-Humans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan Wadden</td>
<td>Rhonda Martens</td>
<td>Olusegun Sammuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>11:50</strong></td>
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<td>Lunch (70 minutes)</td>
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<td><strong>1:00</strong></td>
<td><strong>1:00</strong></td>
<td><strong>3:00</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cognitive Behavioral Therapy as a Solution to the Effects of Microaggression</td>
<td>A Duty to Report: Alternative Journalism as Political Obligation to Resist</td>
<td>Will the Circle be Unbroken? Ethics and Communicative Failure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terese Pierre</td>
<td>Monica Lockett</td>
<td>Timothy Allen</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>1:40</strong></td>
<td><strong>3:40</strong></td>
<td><strong>1:40</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Care Ethical Justification for an Interest Theory of Human Rights</td>
<td>What Do Lisa, Her College’s Chess Club, and NATO Have in Common? Rethinking What it Takes to Be an Agent</td>
<td>Conservatism and Communitarianism: Two or One?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Edward Randell</td>
<td>Michelle Mary Dyke</td>
<td>Mark Young</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2:20</strong></td>
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<td><strong>4:30</strong></td>
<td><strong>2:30</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Relevant Moral and Legal Differences</td>
<td>Climate Ethics and Nietzsche</td>
<td>Trans Justice and Gender Free ID: A Rawlsian Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sandra Tomsons</td>
<td>Christina Ng</td>
<td>Christopher Lowry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>3:10</strong></td>
<td><strong>3:10</strong></td>
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<td>Revisiting ‘Frigidity’: Too Queer for Queers?</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ABSTRACTS

Day One – Saturday June 1, 2019

9:00 AM – Mental Health Stigma, Narrative, and the Lived Experience of Schizophrenia by Andrew Molas

The aim of this paper is to offer a preliminary examination on the importance of narrative for helping to overcome the issue of stigma surrounding mental illness. I begin by discussing what narrative is and why narratives are important for authoring our own stories. I then discuss some potential reasons why the narratives of people with schizophrenia are often dismissed and I maintain that this is due in large part to the damaging effects of stigma. Shifting the negative and harmful impact of stigma surrounding mental illness, and changing the public's perception of mental health challenges in a more positive manner, requires efforts to raise awareness about the realities of living with these diagnoses. To achieve this aim, not only do I draw on patient narrative accounts to underscore the effects of stigma but I also draw on Husserl's phenomenological approach and Toombs' notion of "attentional focus" as means to view mental illness in a different way. By engaging directly with the lived experience of mental illness, and by engaging with the narratives which underscore the damaging impact that stigma has, I maintain that the public can begin developing more accepting views of schizophrenia and begin to support those who need it the most.

9:40 AM - Current Psychiatric Practice: Psychopharmacology v. Psychotherapy by Corinna Lee

The overprescription of drugs has been and continues to be a growing problem. Particularly, psychoactive drugs are being given to a much wider audience - to children, those with less severe forms of mental illness, and off-label uses. This paper discusses the use of antidepressants as a form of treatment for those suffering from mood disorders, like depression, in the North American context. Although I will talk about the use of psychopharmacology in mental diseases in this paper, I will not be discussing the use of drugs in severely mentally incapacitated patients, disorders with a strong biological correlate, or significant abnormalities in brain structure such as dementia, schizophrenia, or a damaged frontal lobe.

Some research shows that “over the decade 1998-2007 a decreasing proportion of mental health outpatients received psychotherapy... [and] during the same period, a large and growing number of outpatients received psychotropic medications without psychotherapy.” Influenced by Big Pharma and prevailing biophysiological or disease-centred models of mental disorders, psychiatrists opt for the obviously less complicated and less time-consuming treatment of scribbling a prescription for their patients. I propose that the problem is twofold. First, psychiatrists are over-prescribing antidepressant medications, and secondly, it is being prescribed to a much bigger group of people than it is intended for. Even though both psychopharmacological and psychotherapeutic options are available as treatment for depression, one out of seven people receive effective treatment, while only 20% of the people prescribed with antidepressants were actually diagnosed with depression.
When refugees and refugee claimants arrive to Canada, they are not immediately eligible for provincial health insurance plans. During their waiting period of three months, for recognised refugees, or until their deportation for rejected claimants, healthcare for refugees and refugee claimants is covered by the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP). In 2012, the program suffered severe cuts, which resulted in the denial of healthcare coverage to several groups of refugees and claimants. Then, in 2016, the IFHP was restored to its pre-2012 coverage. In this paper, I engage Penchansky and Thomas’s (1981) definition of access to assess the impact of the changes on refugees’ and claimants’ access to healthcare. Ultimately, I argue that the 2016 IFHP restoration is not sufficient to guarantee full access to healthcare for refugees and refugee claimants in Canada.

One problem with the current implementation of evidence-based medicine (EBM) is that it does not consider patient testimony to be viable evidence for medical decision-making. The claim is that patient testimony can present biased, uninformed, or baseless information. This rejection of testimony extends to even the best testifiers, e.g. a doctor who has become chronically ill, as it is believed that their judgment has been clouded by their condition. I believe this exclusion of testimony is a problem because patient testimony can be used to help identify what course of action to take on a given problem (these assertions might rule out potential diagnostic tests, or even direct what the healthcare provider (HCP) tries first). Patient testimony is largely taken as irrelevant to EBM because patients are not specialists nor are their assertions grounded in evidence from randomised control trials (RCTs). Several studies have shown that patient testimony is disregarded so quickly that HCPs usually interrupt (or ‘redirect’) a patient as early as the first 11 seconds of an appointment. Yet other studies have demonstrated that HCPs who allow their patient to fully convey what they have to say are more likely to return an evidence-based diagnosis. It is with this dissonance in mind that I argue that patient testimony ought to count as evidence in EBM. The purpose of this paper is not to discredit evidence as it is currently conceived; rather, the aim is to expand what counts as evidence in healthcare.

Microaggressions are the brief and commonplace daily verbal, behavioral, and environmental indignities, whether intentional or unintentional, that communicate hostile, derogatory, or negative racial, gender, sexual-orientation, and religious slights and insults to the target person or group. Microaggressions are broken down into three categories: microaggressions, microinsults and microinvalidations, all serving to subtly, yet continuously, chip away at the psychological stamina and mental health of marginalized groups and affect their quality of life and standard of living. Microaggressions are subjective in nature—personal accounts are adequate to determine whether a microaggression has occurred. Other premises that the concept of microaggressions rests on are that they are interpreted negatively by minority
group members, and may reflect prejudice and implicit bias on the part of those committing the microaggression.

Microaggressions have mainly been studied in the field of psychology, and pro-microaggression accounts highlight anxiety as a common outcome. Cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) has been offered as a solution to the problems that subjective perceptions of microaggressions cause. CBT seeks to improve mental health by having the individual challenge and change cognitive distortions. The idea is that when individuals from marginalized communities believe they have been ‘microaggressed,’ they are to use a cognitive behavioral therapy to hopefully realize that this belief may be incorrect.

This presentation seeks to analyze the legitimacy and benefit—or lack thereof—of using cognitive behavioral therapy as a solution to the effects of microaggression. While cognitive behavioral therapy is successful in many forms of mental illness, and distortions can be debilitating and hindering, using cognitive behavioral therapy for microaggressions may run the risk of harming and dismissing marginalized peoples for responding accurately to actual instances of discrimination. I will analyze arguments for and against using cognitive behavioral therapy for microaggressions.

1:40 PM - A Care Ethical Justification for an Interest Theory of Human Rights by Thomas Edward Randell

Care ethics is often criticized for being incapable of outlining what responsibilities we have to persons beyond our personal relations, especially toward distant others. This criticism centres on care theorists’ claim that the concerns of morality emerge between people, generated through our relations of interdependent care: it is difficult to see how moral duties can be applied to those with whom we do not forge a relationship. In this article, I respond to this criticism by demonstrating how care ethics can be conceived as a cosmopolitan theory of distributive justice. I do so through outlining a novel care ethical justification for an interest theory of human rights. Such a theory will argue that the demands of global justice include various positive actions that aim toward ensuring the conditions for good caring relations to flourish, which in turn protect and promote the vital interests of all persons. The rationale for pursuing this particular conception of care ethics as a cosmopolitan theory is to concurrently advance the sparse work on human rights currently within the care literature, systematizing the ideas of care theorists such as Daniel Engster, Virginia Held, and Fiona Robinson.

2:30 PM - Relevant Moral and Legal Differences by Sandra Tomsons

According to Gordon Gibson, anyone caring about the future of Indigenous Canadians should read There is no Difference: An Argument for the Abolition of the Indian Reserve System and Special Race-Based Laws and Entitlements for Canada’s Indians. Gibson claims lawyer Peter Best has written a volume of deeply researched common sense that “...a beacon in the swamp of Indian (or “aboriginal” -your choice) law and a path to hope for the victims.” My presentation explains why I disagree.

I agree with Best
i. “(T)he perilous state of its founding peoples” is Canada’s greatest social crisis.
ii. Canada’s founding peoples are Indigenous peoples.
I challenge Best’s understanding of the crisis and his “Nelson Mandela Solution” (NMS).
Ignoring colonialism, Best cannot see the fundamental justice problems or the solution.
NMS resurrects White Paper Indigenous persons’ legal equality with Canadians. Blind to the
inequality of Canada and Indigenous nationhood, Best mistakenly presumes the legitimacy of
the Canadian state. He does not see only Indigenous nations are legally and morally
legitimate, and have rights to land and sovereignty.

Best is correct, legal equality can solve unjust disparities. But NMS’s equality sustains colonial
inequality. In Reconciliation Manifesto: Recovering the Land Rebuilding the Economy, Arthur
Manuel’s chain of sound arguments proves Eurocentric racism underlies the normative
premises of Best’s arguments.
Presupposing a false-racist-Eurocentric-inferior-superior-dichotomy (FREISD), Best cannot see
the real holders of rights to land and sovereignty on Turtle Island. Ignoring significant aspects
of Canada’s origin story, he cannot see it is a fictitious sovereign without legal or moral rights
to Indigenous land. FREISD justifies the absurdity of speech acts or acts of parliaments
creating legitimate sovereignty where there are sovereigns. Best’s unsound argument omits
aspects of past and present normative reality on Turtle Island, and it inadvertently supports
the “nation-to-nation-fantasy.”
Day Two – June 2

9:00 AM - Obedience and the Fallibility Thesis by Andrés Molina Ochoa
In The Concept of Law, H. L. A. Hart claims that in order to resist oppressive regimes, it is necessary to “Preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid is not conclusive of the question of obedience.” This argument (hereafter, Hart’s empirical argument) has been usually understood as an argument in favor of the Separability Thesis, namely, the idea that “it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.”
Hart’s empirical claim has been discussed within the framework of Legal Theory, especially because the Separability Thesis is considered as one of the claims that defines Legal Positivism. However, despite the extensive bibliography on Hart’s legal theory, the empirical justification of Hart’s claim has barely been discussed.
This paper analyzes Hart’s empirical claim from two different perspectives. First, it suggests that his empirical claim is an argument in favor of the Fallibility Thesis, the more modest claim that valid laws may fail from a moral perspective, and not in favor of the Separability Thesis. Second, it contrasts Hart’s empirical claim with the evidence gathered by the experiments on obedience practiced by Milgram and inspired by him. Based on this evidence, I claim that legal systems have equal power with the confederates in the obedience experiments and, therefore, legal rules exercise a power that it is almost impossible to resist. Finally, I conclude that although Hart’s empirical claim is not an argument in favor of Legal Positivism, it is a strong argument against the idea that we have a prima facie moral duty to obey the law. If laws may fail from a moral perspective, and if legal authority is difficult to resist, it seems that it may be wrong to presume a general moral duty to obey the law.

9:40 AM - Undoing the Notion of a Right to Do Wrong by Geoff Callaghan
A number of authors have put forward the idea of a right to do wrong (RTDW) as a way of explaining moral rights. Typically their arguments take the following form: if a moral right is to have any real value for the right-holder, it must act to protect not only the right-holder’s morally acceptable choices, but her morally deficient choices as well. Void of this extension (so the argument goes), the right-holder would be limited to making either ‘the right choice’ or ‘the morally insignificant choice’ on every occasion, which in turn would eschew the purpose of assigning the right in the first place.
The argument I make in this paper challenges a number of the assumptions upon which this position rests and, ultimately, its foundational premise. My claim is that the primary purpose for assigning a moral right is not to protect the action, but rather is intended to protect the interest the agent has in developing her moral character. While this interest may indeed extend to actions that are considered to be morally impermissible, it is not paradigmatically characterized by it. This is precisely the mistake advocates of the idea of a RTDW make. The implication of their position is that moral rights can only make sense to the extent that they protect wrong actions. But this is untrue. The primary function of moral rights is to protect the agent in her ability to deliberate about which action is in fact the morally acceptable one.
My argument relies on a recasting of the three-fold taxonomy of moral actions Waldron used to express the idea in his landmark paper on the subject. Whereas there, Waldron
characterized moral actions as either: (a) morally required, (b) morally forbidden, or (c) morally indifferent, for most people engaged in practical moral reasoning, such categories would come across as artificial and simplistic. My proposal is that we substitute Waldron’s list for one that better reflects the choices agents actually face in their moral deliberations, which, roughly speaking, can be captured as: (a’) actions that are generally considered to be morally permissible, (b’) actions that are generally considered to be morally impermissible, and (c’) actions about which there is reasonable moral disagreement. As should be clear from the list itself, this view of moral choice greatly expands the type of action for which agents may require a moral right well past those deemed to be ‘wrong’ per se to actions about which there is genuine uncertainty as to their moral standing.

10:30 AM – Hypocrisy, Privacy, and Affective Computing Technologies by William Buschert

Machines are becoming increasingly good at ‘reading minds’, or, at least, inferring things about people’s emotions and dispositions. Affective computing technologies that analyze facial expressions, eye movements, gait, galvanic skin response, and other factors in order to recognize and interpret human affects are already in use. We can expect these technologies to become cheaper, more widespread, and more effective as time goes on. Robin Hanson (2018) speculates that a likely outcome of these technologies will be a “hypocralypse” – a massive unmasking of widespread, ordinary hypocrisy, which will become increasingly evident once the usual ways of screening feelings become unfeasible. I argue that, for the most part, what will be unmasked by affective computing technologies isn’t actual hypocrisy as philosophers typically understand it (Szabados and Soifer, 1999; McKinnon, 1991). Instead, I argue that the most pronounced effect of (analytic) affective computing technologies will be the further erosion of what Thomas Nagel (1998, 2002) has termed ‘norms of reticence and non-acknowledgement’. Arguably, this will be much worse than what Hanson envisions.

11:10 AM – Technological Unemployment, Citizenship, and Dignity by Rhonda Martens

We may face widespread technological unemployment (TU) in the future because machines will perform tasks, including cognitive and social tasks, that we currently perform. One challenge that TU produces is economic, possibly addressed by introducing a basic income guarantee. Economic considerations are not the only problem, however. I will focus on important non-monetary goods that will be threatened by TU. In particular, if TU occurs because machines can do a better and not just cheaper job than we do, then we lose opportunities to create products and services of value that are valued (not all products and services of value are valued, as the history of domestic labour shows). I will trace out the implications of losing opportunities to create valued products, which include threats to dignity and access to full citizenship, keeping in mind the various conceptions of full citizenship articulated by Lanoix, Lister, Kittay, van Gunsteren, Fraser and Gordon, and others.

I do not think that the solution lies in trying to prevent technological unemployment. Those likely harmed the most by the loss of opportunities to create valued products/services are currently those already tyrannized by work, and are already experiencing threats to their dignity and full citizenship. Instead, it is my position that acting now to improve access to full citizenship will put us in a better position to embrace technological unemployment.
3:00 PM - A Duty to Report: Alternative Journalism as Political Obligation to Resist by Monica Lockett

What it means to be a journalist has changed over time, as evolving responsibilities have led to inquiries on the role of journalists in society. However, what journalists ought to do and what they owe to society is not easily defined, as their unique position of power and prestige can place a greater emphasis on political duty. Generally, as citizens, we are expected to adhere to the state’s laws and fulfill our moral and political obligations in society. Journalists, as citizens, de facto share in this duty. But what remains of this duty when faced or threatened with injustice? How should they go about restoring justice to the state? I utilize a theory on political obligation put forth by philosopher Candice Delmas, who argues that a duty to obey is supplemented with a duty to resist in legitimate states that are perpetuating conditions of injustice to its citizens. The role of journalists and their duty in this context is not to remain neutral and unbiased, I argue, but instead they must take an active part in resisting and remedying the injustice by utilizing their position of power and prestige. Citizens are expected to resist this injustice just as well, but I supplement this with an argument that journalists have a stronger obligation to resist injustice. This paper will aim to establish the extent to which journalists can employ Delmas’ theory on political obligation, through a case study on journalist Justin Brake. In 2016, Brake was charged with civil and criminal offences following his coverage of Indigenous land protectors and their controversial occupation of the Muskrat Falls hydroelectric dam project job site. My paper aims to show that Brake’s actions are supported by Delmas’ argument, and that resistance to injustice expects a greater commitment from those in the journalism field.

3:40 PM - What Do Lisa, Her College’s Chess Club, and NATO Have in Common? Rethinking What it Takes to Be an Agent by Michelle Mary Dyke

In recent years, there has been growing interest in the notion of group agency, the idea that whole groups of people such as wine clubs, budget committees, sports teams, churches, universities, or even international organizations, can count as genuine, unified agents in their own right. Yet is it true that a group like NATO counts as an agent just as a single human person, like Lisa, is an agent? I claim that, yes, they are both genuine agents. I offer here an original characterization of the requirements of agency that, I argue, generates the right verdicts about what counts as an agent, especially when it comes to recognizing cases of genuine group agency. So, what is an agent? If groups can be agents, then neither conscious experience nor a unified deliberative perspective is a requirement of agency. Yet it remains difficult to offer an account of the constitutive requirements of agency that can include groups without overgeneralizing and being forced to include additional things like simple computer programs, machines and even home appliances, which seemingly are not agents at all. This is a problem that faces Christian List & Philip Pettit’s influential (2011) view of agency. I sketch an alternative account that emphasizes the capacity of agents to self-determine their own aims. I suggest that this view succeeds in getting the extension right when it comes to picking out agents. It also corroborates the idea that the notion of agency has normative
significance; an agent is precisely the sort of thing that possesses normative reasons (or obligations or duties, etc.) and can appropriately be judged as rational or irrational.

4:30 PM – Climate Ethics and Nietzsche by Christina Ng

‘[Climate ethics] swamp the machinery of morality, at least as it currently manifests in our moral consciousness.’

Now, Nietzsche’s opposition to morality appears to make him an opponent of the environmentalist agenda. I suggest that the more clearly we see the spirit of Nietzsche’s critique of morality, rather than take it at its letter, the less clearly he stands opposed to the environmentalist. I argue that Nietzsche’s views in fact make him an ally.

Jack lives in LA and enjoys driving on Sunday afternoons. Assume that all that Jack gains is the simple pleasure from driving his convertible. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong distinguishes some more or less ambitious to present a principled objection to Sunday driving. After rehearsing various candidates, he concludes that no moral principle defensibly grounds such intuitions. While environmentalists cannot condemn pleasure driving on moral grounds, they can do so on Nietzschean grounds. Individuals might not be morally blameworthy, but those who carelessly contribute to carbon emissions can be criticised as weak. Along the same lines, we can praise those who take global warming as a matter of personal consideration as splendid individuals.

Nietzsche is interested in what constitutes ‘splendid’ human beings: ‘What is good? – All that heightens the feeling of power, the will to power, power itself in man. What is bad? – All that proceeds from weakness.’ By affecting a complacent attitude towards her climate-related actions, an agent does not exercise power but instead proceeds from weakness.
9:00 AM – Non State Actors and Global Collective Action Problems by Dan McArthur

A large number of issues facing the world today a global in scope and not within the power of any one nation to solve. Examples abound: ocean pollution, climate change, threats to the ozone layer and even the cleanup of satellite threatening space junk are but a few examples. Philosophers, such as Dale Jamieson and Stephen Gardiner, in recent years have focused on climate change perhaps the most but they also have converged on a general approach to such collective action problems. They have correctly emphasized not just the difficulty in addressing such problems, but regard them as moral problems and treat them as such. Harms to future morally significant future persons and unjust burdens imposed on the poorer nations have focused analysis on the moral responsibilities of nations and individuals within them as well. However, in the climate field especially, this approach has neglected some of the most important actors, achieving perhaps the most, non-state actors at all levels: sub-state, business and multinationals, NGOs, international organizations such as the WTO or UNESCO and municipalities to name a few. This paper will explore the role such actors and their implications across a road platforms of collective action problems, beyond just climate change. This paper will examine the role such actors can have in addressing the applied ethic implications of such problems such unfair distribution of burdens and benefits across nations, international justice issues and the consideration of future generations.

9:40 AM – Spherical Students in a Vacuum: Teaching business ethics in a less than ideal world by Greg Andres

Game theory is a powerful tool for analyzing strategic interactions between rational actors. In philosophy, game theory is used by ethicists to ground their theories--David Gauthier is a notable example. But the use of game theory in the realm of ethics is not without its controversies. Robert Solomon decries the encroachment of game theory into ethics as one of the worst things to happen to ethics. We argue that Solomon mischaracterizes the role of game theory in ethics by positing that the theory is strictly instructive of how to conduct business. The role of game theory varies, however. When teaching students about social action problems, game theory is a diagnostic tool that highlights incentives and reveals values. Our goal in this paper is to defend the use of game theory as a pedagogical tool for business ethics. A responsible business ethics curriculum involves teaching students about social action problems, and what ethics has to say about resolving these problems. Our claim is that game theory is an indispensable tool in teaching business students how to respond ethically to social action problems.
The non-identity problem arises when an agent’s action inflicts a very undesirable state on an individual but also maximizes the individual’s well-being. One prominent resolution of the non-identity problem is to reject the judgment that such actions are wrong. Assuming that this is the correct resolution, does it follow that it is permissible for farmers to humanely raise and kill their animals, given that these animals would not exist if the farmers did not create them? I argue that this does not follow. If the farmer’s options are artificially limited to (1) not creating the animal, and (2) creating it and humanely slaughtering it, then non-identity considerations are exonerating. But, in actual practice, farmers almost always have the option of not killing the animal and continuing to support it. Thus, killing the animal is not the action that maximizes the animal’s well-being.

The paper argues that neither rationality nor sentience approaches to obligations can fully address the “hyperseparation” of humans from the earth environment. This paper tries to dissolve such a deep-rooted dichotomy in environmental worldviews by reconceiving humanity to include its relationships with the natural world. The paper draws on Arne Naess’ idea of togetherness through which it reconceives individuals in terms of their connections, and the contexts they are situated. This allows for a two-tier frame for how to conceive of humanity’s place and moral role within the natural environment that can reconcile the vast divide between humans and the ‘exploited other’ (the ‘other’ being the earth environment and the beings and entities therein). As an alternative, the paper shows that grounding duties on entities’ relationships with place is better suited to lessen the earth-destroying separatist ethos. It, thus, argues that (1) destruction to place may result in harms to entities, individuals and groups, that are situated in that place, and (2) duties should be assessed in relation to an individual’s or species’ wellbeing in that place.

Philosophers in the analytic tradition have devoted a great deal of attention to explaining successful communication. Syntax and semantics attracted the most attention in the earlier period, in the 1930s through the 1950s; the development of pragmatics in the 1970s enhanced the success of the agenda, by articulating, with engineering-like precision, the locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary features of utterances. Grice’s framework, with its central idea of conversational implicature, became widely recognized as the most insightful and influential analysis. To achieve their goal, speech acts must conform to a set of maxims: Speech acts must be informative, perspicuous, true, relevant, unobscure, unambiguous, orderly, and avoiding needless prolixity. The key point underlying these maxims is that the conversational implicatures must be calculable, that the hearer must be able to figure out what the speaker is attempting to convey. Although the strategy applies to speech acts, in its main lines, it applies to what is expressed in writing as well. As regards communicative failure, how it occurs is explained in terms of
syntactic, semantic, or pragmatic norms being breached, while why it occurs is explained by speakers or writers being lax or disingenuous.

The most puzzling types of miscommunication are those in which speakers or writers present inconsistent accounts, especially in claims having ethical significance. This paper attempts an explanation of why this occurs in such cases.

Inconsistent accounts are clearly communicative failures of some kind; explaining why they occur, in terms of speakers or writers being lax or disingenuous fails to provide a satisfying account, however.

This paper examines several examples of this type of communicative failure, considers possible analyses of what underlies them, and provides an alternative solution in terms of hidden constraints in the speaker’s or writer’s sense of individual autonomy.

1:40 PM - Conservatism and Communitarianism: Two or One? by Mark Young

The goal of this presentation is to argue that conservatism and communitarianism are not distinct positions, but instead two names for the same approach to social and political arrangements and issues. Consulting texts by Edmund Burke, Michael J. Sandel and Tom Flanagan it is argued that the two positions are the same for two reasons. First, both are flexible in regard too their social and political prescriptions. Second both rely on communal traditions, rather than reason, to justify social and political prescriptions. One practical outcome of seeing them as the same is a better understanding of how Donald Trump could displace the Classical Liberal approach of Republicans with his nationalist approach. Explaining the phenomena of Trump’s by relying on aspects of both Conservatism and Communitarianism will then further the argument for the claim that the two positions are actually the same position.

2:30 PM - Trans Justice and Gender Free ID: A Rawlsian Approach by Christopher Lowry

This paper aims to advance the argument in favour of gender-free ID. With progress in some jurisdictions in the form of (1) the removal of surgical requirements for change of sex designation or gender marker on ID, (2) the addition of “X” as a third gender marker, and (3) the explicit recognition that gender markers should be based on self-reported gender identity, rather than sex, the leading edge of the debate about how to improve ID so as to further justice for transgender, non-binary, intersex, two-spirit, and/or gender non-conforming people (among others) has turned to the question of whether to remove gender entirely from government-issued identification. After examining existing arguments for genderless ID, such as the othering effects of the “X” option and, more generally, gender markers’ contribution to the persistence of transphobic harassment and discrimination, we employ a Rawlsian approach to evaluate and respond to arguments for gendered ID that appeal to benefits for airport security, prison security, health care, and equity. We show that gendered ID fails to meet standards of justice in all four of these contexts. Our analysis of Rawls includes attention to his view (1) that injustice “is simply inequalities that are not to the benefit of all” (Rawls, TJ 1999, 54), (2) that the justice of the basic structure of society should be evaluated from the perspective of “relevant social positions” (Rawls, TJ 1999, 84-85; Rawls, JFR 2001, 64-66), and
Asexuality signifies a lack of warmth or an aversion or “abnormal” apathy to sexuality. Asexuality continues to be a misunderstood, and perhaps worse, relatively unknown label of self-identification. Pathologized, asexuality finds its corollary label classified in the DSM, including the DSM’s most recent incarnation - DSM-V - as “hyposexual dysfunction disorder.” In the everyday world, asexuals are often derogatorily conceptualized as “frigid” or as “prudes.” Pro-sex movements, while being emancipatory for some or perhaps even most (women especially), sometimes serve to further marginalize asexuals. More generally, Western society’s compulsory sexuality serves to reinforce the notion that there is something wrong with asexual people. I hope to show that the “wrongness” or “pathos” of asexuality is not symptomatic of individuals per se. Rather, it is better understood as a symptom of a systemic and systematic ideology concerning the naturalness of sex and male and female eroticism, be it heterosexual or otherwise.

Using the work of Simone de Beauvoir from The Second Sex (1949) and Suzanne Laba Cataldi’s (2006) reading of Beauvoir in “Sexuality Situated: Beauvoir on “Frigidity” (2006), I hope to create a feminist framework by which to analyze asexuality across various dimensions - the existential, metaphysical, epistemological, and the ideological. Empirical and psychological investigations are but one dimension of capturing the meaning and the constraints and enablements that follow from “being asexual.” In Ian Hacking’s terms, asexual people are also subject to the looping effect. Being characterized as asexual by oneself or by others, an individual has some capacity to negotiate the meaning of that characterization - to accept, reject, or alter it. Beauvoir reconstructs frigidity as an active resistance to one’s situation rather than a passive pathology. I hope to further underscore this important rearticulation and to buttress Beauvoir’s reading with Sally Haslanger’s work in Resisting Reality (2012) on ameliorative social constructionist programs (programs that ask what do “we” want the concept of, in this case, “asexual” to represent or do?).

While much attention has been focused on gay rights and pro-sex issues, asexuality has and continues to be marginalized in society writ large and within the marginalized LGBT community as well. As non-heteronormative, non-monogamous, and pro-sex movements gain momentum and public support, asexuals are left by the wayside. This serves to underpin asexuality as a pathos, creating a climate, whether academic or in the everyday world, where allies are hard to come by on account of an epistemic harm: the notion of asexuality is not well-enough understood to be defended, questioned, or even re-evaluated.